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* n T n e Problems of Philosophy, Russell held that 
universals do not exist, they subsist. In the same work, 
he held also that universals are nonetheless "something. 
This is very puzzling. For if universals are "something," 
then they exist. But then they cannot very well exist 
and also not exist. Or was Russell suggesting that there 
is a second meaning of the term "exist," that expressed 
by the term "subsist?" But this too is problematic, 
for it is hard to make clear what this second meaning 
might be. 2 
That universals should be thought to enjoy a special 
mode of being is a traditional idea which likely has its 
source in Plato's famous thesis that Forms have greater 
reality than individual things.3 Like Russell's formula-
tion, it too conflicts with an obvious and quite correct 
intuition: existence, insofar as we understand it at 
all, is an all-or-nothing affair. Something either 
exists or else it does not, simpliciter. There is no 
room here for the idea that something exists to a 
greater, or lesser, degree than something else. Of 
course, we can have properties which are exemplified by 
some things to a greater degree than they are exemplified 
by other things, as when a ripe tomato is said to ex-
emplify redness to a greater degree than a less ripe one. 
But typically this just means that one thing can exemplify 
a darker shade of red than another. Existence, however, 
is not like shades or red. It does not come in shades 
at all. 
Plato's thesis is hard to accept as it stands. 
Nonetheless, there are some intuitions behind it which 
are as hard to reject as the intuition that existence 
does not admit of degrees. Universals, philosophers 
have rightly felt, must be radically different sorts of 
entities from individual things because they are abstract, 
eternal, exist necessarily and, above all, are what can 
be "in the many," to use Aristotle's telling phrase. 
None of these characterizations apply, or could apply, 
to individual things. The difference has seemed, upon 
reflection, to be so great as to warrant the further 
attribution of one kind of being to universals and 
another kind of being to individual things. 
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The distinction between existence and subsistence 
and Plato's degrees of reality thesis, then, share a 
common intuitive motivation. In fact, the former can 
be regarded as but a modern replacement of the latter. 
Russell, as a good Platonist, duly echoes the Platonic 
influence. 
Unfortunately, the replacement is no better off 
than the original. The distinction between existence 
and subsistence, insofar as it implies that there must 
be two meanings of "exist," is not any clearer than talk 
about degrees of reality. 
I will argue in this paper, however, that there is 
a way to do justice to Russell's (and Plato's) intuition 
that there is something special about the mode of being 
of universals which does not imply duovocalism1* with 
respect to the concept of existence, the concept usually 
represented by quantifiers. I will show.both that we 
can have two kinds of existents without two concepts of 
existence and that good logical sense can be made of 
this Platonist intuition. 
The passage in which Russell seems to be leaning 
towards duovocalism is this: 
We shall find it convenient only to speak of 
things existing when they are in time, that 
is to say, when we can point to some time at 
which they exist (not excluding the possibility 
of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts 
and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. 
But universals do not exist in this sense; we 
shall say that they subsist or have being, 
where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as 
being timeless. The world of universals, 
therefore, may also be described as the world 
of being (Russell, pp. 99-100). 
Russell is making here two different points at once which 
I shall try to distinguish. 
First, Russell claims that we must distinguish 
between the concept of existence which applies to ". . . 
thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects," and 
the concept of existence which applies to universals. 
Second, he justifies the need for drawing this distinc-
tion by pointing to the temporality of the objects fall-
ing under the first concept as opposed to the non-
temporality of the objects falling under the second, 
according to him a significant enough difference between 
these objects to warrant a difference in mode of exis-
tence . 
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Temporality is the means by which Russell intends 
to distinguish the mode of being of universals from that 
of individual things. We may draw this distinction 
while preserving univocalism with respect to existence 
as follows: 
Dl. a exists =Df (Ey)(y=a) 
D2. a subsists =Df (Ey)(y=a 6 (z)(Tz+ zly)) 
D3. a texists =Df (EyMTy E y=a) 
(where "T" abbreviates "is a temporal object.") 5 
Thus instead of saying that universals do not exist 
but subsist Russell can now say, quite consistently with 
the intuitions expressed in the above passage, that 
universals do not texist but subsist--and that individual 
things texist not subsist. Thus the appearance of con-
tradiction is dispelled. 
On this view of Russell's distinction between 
existence and subsistence universals and individual 
things can be thought to belong to different ontological 
orders without existing in different senses. The 
accounts of subsistence and texistence set forth in D2 
and D3 do not, as promised, imply duovocalism with re-
spect to this basic sense of "exist," the sense set 
forth in Dl. On the contrary, these definitions pre-
suppose a uniform meaning of identity and of the 
existential quantifier. 
A general principle concerning existents which is 
in keeping with Russell's early Realism emerges out of 
these considerations. It is that there are two and only 
two kinds of existents: texistents and subsistents. 
Thus it is a necessary truth that 
(PR) (x)(x exists -»-(x subsists v x texists)). 
We have in PR a precise statement of the view sometimes 
associated with Platonic Realism that reality is funda-
mentally dulaistic; that, as Plato himself puts it, 
". . . there is no further thing distinct from the One 
and the Others; when we have named the One and the 
Others, we have named all things."6 
It is worth noting that the distinction between 
the universals existence, subsistence and texistence 
drawn in the above definitions also has a syntactical 
aspect. For it shows up in the logical form of the open 
sentences expressing them. The first is expressed by 
the open sentence "(Ey)(y=x)," the second by the open 
sentence "(Ey)(y=x £ (z) (Tz •*• z/x)) ," and the third by the 
open sentence "(Cy)(Ty F, y=x)." Thus it might be said 
exis tence is a simple or pure propertywhile subs is-
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tence and texistence being built up logically out of it 
and other ingredients are complex. 
To sum up, I have argued that we can understand 
the Platonistic intuition that universals and individual 
things have different modes of being without implying 
that there is more than one fundamental concept of 
existence. I realize, of course, that it is still an 
open question whether anything subsists. My defini-
tions do not settle this issue. Nor do these defini-
tions attempt to distinguish between the various kinds 
of universals which may be said to subsist in the sense 
specified, between predicables such as qualities and 
relations, and non-predicables such as propositions, 
numbers and sets. These are different problems. Mine 
has been only how to demystify subsistence.9 
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NOTES 
"It [the relation "north of"] is neither in space 
nor in time, neither mental nor material; yet it is 
something," p. 98. 
o 
Thus Gustav Bergmann: ". . . I understand [none] 
but the most strictly univocal use of 'exist,'" Realism 
(University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 3. Another 
prominent strict univocalist is, of course, Quine. See 
also A. C. Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy 
(Collier Books, 19627, p. 235, and A. D. Woozley, Theory 
of Knowledge (Hutchinson 6 Co., 1949), p. 75, for 
further qualms about the intelligibility of a second 
meaning of "exist." 
3 
Commentators have not overlooked this puzzling 
thesis. See G. Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in Plato," 
in R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle 
(Humanities Press, 1965) , pp. 1-19. 
''The term is Morton White's. See Toward Reunion in 
Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 61. 
5 . . 
The quantifiers in these definitions function 
objectionally not substitutional^, as is evident from 
Dl. This does not beg the question against Russell 
since he does not deny objectuality to universals. 
g 
Parmenides 159B-C, Cornford translation. Plato 
uses the expression "the One" when speaking about Forms, 
and the expression "the Others" when speaking about 
individual exemplifying things. 
7 
Plato himself, it should be noted, held that 
existence was a property. See Parmenides 142B, 
Theaetetus 186A and Sophist 259A. 
Q 
I have tried to close this question in my disser-
tation, A Platonist Theory of Properties, Brown Univer-
sity, 197 7. 
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Thanks to the editors, to P. L.'Quinn and to 
Josiah Strandberg for helpful comments. 
